What was ted bundy charged with




















Bundy decided against self-representation, and his defence counsel pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Bundy had lost all traces of his confident demeanour by this stage, and the volume of forensic evidence and eyewitness testimony linking him to the crime convinced the jury to again return a guilty verdict. Another sentence of death by electrocution was handed down on 7 February Ted Bundy - The Trial.

Crime Files. He later expanded his area of attack to Colorado and, on August 16, , was arrested by police as he prowled a neighborhood in his Volkswagen. In Aspen, Bundy was charged with murder but escaped out the window of the courthouse library.

For eight days he eluded authorities on the outskirts of Aspen. When he was finally caught, Bundy was put in a jail cell, only to escape again on December 30, , while awaiting trial.

Within two weeks, he had settled near Florida State University and began raping and killing more young women. Two weeks after a sorority house attack, Bundy raped and strangled year-old Kimberly Leachnear Jacksonville. Days later, Bundy was arrested while driving a stolen Volkswagen. Bundy ably defended himself at trial, but the evidence, including teeth marks on one of his victims, condemned him to a death sentence in Florida.

For the next 10 years, Bundy filed appeal after appeal to avoid the electric chair. This was unsuccessful, and he eventually confessed to 36 murders. When he was executed on January 24, , thousands of people came to cheer outside the Florida State Prison. But if you see something that doesn't look right, click here to contact us! By , Netflix had already fundamentally changed the way Americans consumed movies and television. The service offered unlimited DVD rentals—and, starting in , direct streaming of many of its titles—for a flat monthly fee, a wildly popular model that almost single-handedly He then enters another home a few blocks away and brutally assaults another student, Cheryl Thomas.

Kleiner, Chandler and Thomas survive their injuries, though none is able to describe the attacker. Seventh grader Kimberly Leach disappears in the middle of the day from Florida's Lake City Junior High School; at 12 years of age, she is significantly younger than Bundy's usual victims. Her body is found two months later under a shed in Suwannee River State Park. After pulling over a car with its headlights off at a. Unwilling to give his identity right away, the man eventually reveals himself to be the FBI-wanted Bundy.

The trial — reportedly the first to be televised nationally — commences with jury selection at Miami's Dade County Metro Justice Building. Off the bat, Bundy complains to Judge Edward Cowart about the conditions of his prison cell, paving the way for a bizarre month of proceedings, during which he bickers with his counsel, takes the reins to cross-examine a police officer and sits for testimony while referring to himself in the third person.

Despite defense objections to his testimony being permitted, forensic dentist Richard Souviron compares large photographs of Bundy's teeth to those of the bite marks found on one of the FSU students and proclaims them to be a match. After deliberating for less than seven hours, the jury of seven men and five women find Bundy guilty of first-degree murder of Bowman and Levy and the attempted murders of Kleiner, Chandler and Thomas.

The following week, he is sentenced to die in Florida's electric chair. Ted Bundy at his trial in for the murder of year-old Kimberly Leach. Brought to Orlando for his second murder trial in a half-year span, Bundy is undone by the testimony of a firefighter who had seen the suspect lead the year-old to his van and the matching clothing fibers found on both the alleged killer and victim.

One month later, the jury finds Bundy guilty once again. During the penalty phase of the trial, Bundy proposes to girlfriend Carole Boone in the presence of a notary public, rendering their marriage legal. Shortly afterward, the jurors recommend the death sentence for the newly married convict. Crime reporter Ann Rule publishes The Stranger Beside Me , her recollections of working alongside Bundy at a suicide crisis hotline in the early s and their evolving friendship as he came to be recognized as a deadly serial killer.

The following year, Elizabeth Kendall writes of her own close encounters as Bundy's girlfriend of several years in The Phantom Prince. Just hours before his scheduled execution for killing Leach, Bundy is granted a stay to determine his mental competency during his trial. Thirteen months later, a district judge rules that Bundy was fully competent for the trial, calling him a "diabolical genius" for good measure. Shirley, Brown v. State, and many other recent opinions of various courts, the great weight of scientific opinion appears to be that such a belief that a subject can be made to re-experience a visual perception under hypnosis is to be considered highly suspect if not clearly erroneous.

Nita Neary testified that while she was under hypnosis her memory seemed clear and her concentration seemed focused. The tape of the hypnotic session showed the suggestions she was given by the police hypnotist who was apparently trying to elicit a statement implicating the sorority house maintenance man.

But as Ms. Neary testified and as the trial court found, the hypnotic session did not add to or change her essential description of the man she saw. From the time of her initial statements on the morning of the crimes, through all her interviews by police, through all her pre-trial statements, up to and including her in-court description of the man she saw, Ms.

Neary's description remained substantially consistent. The scientific literature indicates that suggestions from the hypnotist or creations of the subject in response to pressure from the hypnotist may be so firmly incorporated into the subject's memory that it is impossible to trace them to their origins and impossible to undermine them by cross examination. This is one of the problems leading many courts to declare hypnotically aided testimony inadmissible per se.

However, this obviously did not happen here. The tape of the hypnotic session showed that Ms. Neary tried to resist the pressures of the hypnotist and when he persisted, she expressed confusion, which he then "commanded" her not to feel. Ultimately Ms. Neary repudiated any independent personal knowledge of the details elicited during the hypnotic trance. The trial judge was satisfied that her trial testimony was based on her own recollection unaffected by the hypnotic experiment.

This is not a case where the state relied at trial on the technique of hypnosis to show how an improved recall of past events was obtained. It is not a case where the state sought to present an expert to state an opinion as to the accuracy or reliability of testimony derived from a hypnotic examination.

It is not a case where the state sought to refer to the technique of hypnosis to bolster the credibility of a previously hypnotized witness. The matter of the hypnosis was only raised by the defendant's motion to suppress Nita Neary's testimony. The state elicited testimony from her at trial about the hypnosis only in anticipation of the defense attack on her credibility.

It is for these reasons that we do not believe the question of the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony or the test by which its admissibility should be judged is even presented. Under these circumstances, we do not hesitate to hold that the fact that the hypnosis took place was a matter relating only to the weight of the testimony and not to its admissibility. Furthermore, under these circumstances the burden was on the defense to establish that the hypnosis rendered the testimony so unreliable as to be inadmissible and this it failed to do.

See United States v. Awkard, F. Collins v. Superior Court, Ariz. Lucas, Misc. As was stated above, prior to trial the defense presented an expert to testify about the problems inherent in hypnosis as an aid to recollection and to point out the actual instances of suggestiveness and pressure revealed by the tape of the hypnosis session.

At the trial proper the defense declined to use its expert, choosing instead to simply play the tape of the hypnosis session for the jury. Thus the circumstances of the hypnosis and the procedure used were fully disclosed to the jury and the defense had every opportunity to attack the credibility of Nita Neary based on the fact that she had been hypnotized. The trial judge was satisfied that Nita Neary's testimony was based upon her independent recollection untainted by any improper suggestions the hypnotist's prodding may have tended to plant.

Reviewing the trial judge's determination in light of the massive pretrial and trial record pertaining to this issue, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by so ruling. We therefore find appellant's contention to be without merit. Appellant also questions the admissibility of Nita Neary's identification testimony on another ground. He argues that his right to due process of law was violated because before trial an impermissibly suggestive photographic selection procedure was used which affected Ms.

Neary's testimony to appellant's prejudice. Such a contention calls for the application of a two-pronged test inquiring into 1 whether the police used an impermissibly suggestive procedure in obtaining the identification and 2 if so, whether that suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of an irreparable mistaken identification.

Manson v. Brathwaite, U. United States, U. We find that neither requirement is satisfied. Specifically, Bundy claims that the police used an impermissibly suggestive procedure in having Ms. Neary choose his picture from an array of photographs. He argues that the procedure used resulted in a substantial likelihood of misidentification because of a suggestive comment made by the officer while showing the array of photographs and because she may have been influenced by seeing pictures of Bundy in a newspaper prior to choosing his photograph from the array.

The suggestive comment complained about was the police officer's asking her to select the photograph of the person that resembled the suspect. This remark implying that the suspect's picture was included in the array of ten photographs did not render the procedure impermissibly suggestive.

State v. Colby, A. Bumpus, Mass. Davis, 25 N. Commonwealth, Va. State, 65 Wis. See also Annot. We also find that Ms. Neary's having seen pictures of Bundy in the newspaper did not render the identification procedure impermissibly suggestive. Some courts have held that the holding in Simmons, that a photographic identification will not be admissible where the procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, does not apply to situations where a witness had earlier observed a picture of the defendant in the news media.

United States v. Peele, F. Zeiler, F. State, Ga. State, Ind. Grose, F. Boston, F. Milano, F. Here Ms. Neary said that the newspaper photographs had no effect on her because they were not profiles. Her view of the intruder was a profile, she said, and so was the picture she selected from the photographic line-up. Because Bundy failed to show that the police used an impermissibly suggestive procedure in obtaining an identification, we find that Ms.

Neary's identification testimony was properly admitted. Grant v. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court's finding that the procedures used in this case did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

Brathwaite, the trial court specifically found:. These findings support the trial court's conclusion that under the totality of the circumstances there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.

Next Bundy argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever counts six and seven, which pertained to the crimes that occurred at the duplex apartment on Dunwoody Street, from the remaining counts.

We do not find the joinder of all seven counts to have been either improper or prejudicial. Two or more offenses are properly joined if they are based "on two or more connected acts or transactions.

In determining whether two acts or transactions are connected for purposes of consolidation, this Court has considered the temporal and geographical association, the nature of the crimes, and the manner in which they were committed.

State, 66 So. Here the crimes occurred within a few blocks of each other and within the space of a couple of hours. The crimes were similar in that they involved a person entering the residences of female students in an off-campus neighborhood and beating young white women with a club as they slept.

Hence the criminal acts are connected by the close proximity in time and location, by their nature, and by the manner in which they were perpetrated. Even though two or more related offenses are properly joined, a severance should be granted upon a showing that it is necessary to promote or achieve "a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Bundy claims that he was prejudiced by the joinder because it allowed the state to introduce evidence of separate criminal offenses which otherwise would not have been admissible if a severance had been granted.

We do not agree with this assumption. Even if there had been separate trials, evidence of the crimes occurring at either location would have been admissible at the trial concerning the crimes at the other location since such evidence was relevant to showing a common scheme and identity. See Williams v. Since the same evidence would have been admissible at either trial, Bundy has failed to demonstrate that a severance was necessary for a fair determination of his guilt or innocence.

We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever the two groups of charges. Bundy's next point on appeal is that the trial court erred in excusing two veniremen for cause. Appellant argues that they voiced only general objections to the death penalty and therefore their dismissal violated principles announced in Witherspoon v. Illinois, U. A close examination of the voir dire, however, reveals that the two veniremen had more than general philosophical objections to the death penalty.

When questioned by the trial judge, both stated that they would not be able to return a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder knowing that a conviction of such an offense could possibly lead to the imposition of a sentence of death. Because they acknowledged that they could not be neutral in reaching a verdict, Bundy was not denied due process of law by their excusal for cause.

The next point on appeal pertains to the denial of several pretrial motions concerning the grand jury. In February , after Bundy had been arrested on some unrelated charges, a public defender's office was appointed to represent him. Between July 18 and 21, , the assistant public defender assigned to represent Bundy filed motions 1 seeking information about grand jury proceedings and to record and transcribe the grand jury proceedings; 2 for orders restraining grand juries from returning indictments against Bundy; 3 seeking voir dire examination of the grand jurors; and 4 challenging the legality of the grand jury.

In response the state filed a motion to quash the motions, arguing that the assistant public defender who had filed them had no authority to file the motions since they were beyond the scope of his appointment and that the motions were untimely filed since the grand jury had been impaneled on June 5. At a hearing held on July 21, Judge John Rudd, who initially presided over the case, denied Bundy's request for the public defender and denied the motions.

Three days later Judge Rudd reversed himself on Bundy's request and appointed the public defender to represent Bundy in all matters pending before the grand jury. A hearing was held on July 24 at which the assistant public defender was allowed to argue the merits of the four motions filed between July 18 and The next day Judge Rudd denied the motions and in a written order filed August 1 explained his reasons.

In that order he found that Bundy, by virtue of having been served with a search warrant on April 27, knew or had reason to believe that at the time the grand jury was impaneled he would be involved in its investigation. The judge concluded that the motions were untimely filed under section Bundy later moved to quash the indictment on the grounds that he was not provided a fair hearing on these motions.

A hearing on this motion was held before Judge Edward D. Cowart, who presided at trial, on May 16, At the hearing the assistant public defender who filed the earlier motions acknowledged that he had knowledge of Bundy's having been served with a search warrant and of the extensive publicity prior to the convening of the grand jury. At this hearing defense counsel announced they were abandoning all the challenges to the grand jury except the principal one which was that the grand jury was prejudiced by the extensive publicity.

The trial court denied the motion to quash. In this appeal Bundy claims that the motions filed in July of challenging or objecting to the grand jury on the ground of extensive pretrial publicity were timely since he had not actually been served with notice that the grand jury would be considering offenses which he was suspected of committing.

As an alternative argument he claims that if service of a search warrant constitutes notice, he should at that time have been appointed counsel for the purpose of filing and preserving his objections to the grand jury. He argues that it was a violation of his right to due process to appoint counsel after the deadline for filing objections to the grand jury had passed. See Reece v. Georgia, U. In Reece the defendant challenged his conviction on the ground that the grand jury was unconstitutionally selected.

He had initially raised the issue by filing a motion to quash the indictment seven days after he was indicted.

The Georgia Supreme Court refused to grant relief because of a rule of practice which required objections to the competency of grand jurors to be made prior to the returning of an indictment. The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that inasmuch as the defendant was a semi-literate person of low mental ability who was without benefit of counsel and the order by which the grand jury reconvened did not list him as a person against whom a case would be presented, the defendant had not had an opportunity to raise his objections.

This case is distinguishable because Bundy had an adequate opportunity to raise his objections in a timely manner.



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